Distinguishing between '(good) governance' as a process and an outcome, this paper examines both the processes and outcomes of governance in the context of the EU's relationship with ACP States within the period of the Cotonou Agreement (CA). It discusses and assesses a variety of governance mechanisms, including the European Commission's use of the governance concept, EPAs, manifestations of partner preferences, the EDF, the revision of the CA, and Fisheries Partnership Agreements.
Is the EU's governance 'good'?: An assessment of EU governance in its partnership with ACP States
The purpose of this paper is to examine the forms of governance being promoted and exhibited by the European Union (EU) 2 in its relationship with the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) Group of States within the framework of the Cotonou Agreement (CA) (2000 -2020) . The paper will further distinguish between forms of governance promoted rhetorically versus those manifested in practice. The purpose of the comparison is a twofold evaluation: first, the paper evaluates the extent to which the concept of 'good governance', as promoted by the EU, is applied by the EU within the context of its relationship with ACP States. Second, the paper evaluates the extent to which governance strategies displayed by the EU promote sustainable development and the alleviation of extreme poverty in ACP States. It is posited that, like most other donor agencies, the EU does not clearly articulate the objectives of its governance agenda, and acts in such a way that its processes of governance and their outcomes fail to fulfil the criteria for good governance that it sets for others.
The paper first introduces the ACP Group, and the EU bodies that are relevant to its relationship with ACP States. We then briefly discuss key concepts that structure the ACP -EU relationship including governance, development, partnership and power. Next, various governance instruments employed by the EU in its relationship with the ACP States are identified. Examples of each instrument are discussed and assessed based upon two criteria: a) the extent to which the wielding of the mechanism by the EU is a manifestation of "good governance", and b) the extent to which the EU's wielding of the mechanism has resulted, or is likely to result, in the sustainable development of and reduction of poverty in ACP countries. The final section summarizes the assessment and offers recommendation for improving consistency between the governance that the EU applies in its relations with ACP States and the governance it alleges to promote through its development cooperation with them.
The Actors

ACP Group
The ACP Group of States is constituted by 79 developing countries, all but one (Cuba) of which have signed the CA, which officiates the relationship between the ACP Group and the EU. The Group's founding statute is the Georgetown Agreement (signed on 06 June 1975), and it has a permanent Secretariat, which is based in Brussels,
Belgium. The Summit of ACP Heads of State and Government is the supreme organ of the Group, whilst the ACP Council of Ministers is the Group's main decision-making body. The Council is assisted by a Brussels-based ACP Committee of Ambassadors in the execution of its tasks. The Group is structured into six regions: the Caribbean, the Pacific, West Africa, Central Africa, East Africa and Southern Africa (Bradley, 2004) .
Relevant EU Bodies
The European Commission comprises a number of services that have a direct influence on ACP-EC relations, including 'DG Development and Relations with African, Caribbean and Pacific States', responsible for development policy; 'DG External Cooperation Programmes' (EuropeAid), responsible for the implementation of development programmes and projects; 'DG Relex', responsible for external relations;
'DG Trade'; and 'ECHO', responsible for humanitarian aid. These services operate in a semi-autonomous fashion and have different interpretations of the objectives enshrined in the EU Development Consensus (ECDPM and ActionAid, unpublished discussion note).
In addition, most of the 27 EU Member States possess national development policies and instruments.
Governance
The word 'governance' derives from a Greek work that means 'to steer'.
Academics from diverse disciplinary backgrounds have elaborated upon the 'steering' concept. Kooiman (1993: 2) concurs with the work of Rosenau (1992) in defining governance as 'all those activities of social, political and administrative actors that can be seen as purposeful efforts to guide, steer, control or manage societies'. Rosenau (1995: 14) elaborates that governance encompasses the activities of government as well as 'many other channels through which commands flow, and includes framing goals, issuing directives, pursuing policies and changing norms. Smouts (1998) emphasizes governance as a process that necessitates continual interaction and Finkelstein (1995) highlights the role of 'purposive actors' in this process. Similarly, the definition of governance proposed by Mayntz (2004 : 66, in Draude 2007 as 'forms of collective regulation of social circumstances' 3 and that of Schimank (2004: 19, in Draude 2007: 6) Here, the evaluation 'good' captures both the process of governance ('management') and the (intended) outcome of governance, which is specified as 'equitable and sustainable development'.
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Poor or Malign Governance
A lack of good governance might be called 'poor' or 'bad' governance. As with its counterpart, an unfavourable evaluation of governance can either describe the process or the outcomes of governance. Bad governance -or more adeptly: 'poorly governed' -can describe opaque (as opposed to transparent) management, a lack of clearly defined rules and procedures, or a failure to implement such rules and procedures (e.g. not being accountable to the defined rules and procedures). However, opacity and ad-hoc decision making may or may not result in deprivation or lack of choice (outcomes Consensus is grounded on the principle of sustainable, equitable and participatory human and social development, and it emphasises the promotion of human rights, democracy, rule of law and good governance. Similarly, the CA underscores economic, social and cultural facets of development, which clearly concurs with a broad conception of human development that encompasses reducing 'deprivation' as well as broadening choice (Nafziger, 2007; Sen, 1999; Thorbecke, 2007) .
As discussed by Hout (this volume) and Carbone (this volume), governance is a concept that has come to play a very present role in discussions about sustainable development. Montagner (2006) discusses three ways in which the term governance has been used in the context of the EU's development politics. These include governance applied to the European space and to Community politics, (good) governance within partner countries of the EU, and governance at the heart of the 'organisational field' of civil society. More recently some attention has been given to 'aid governance', whereby donors have been under pressure to apply governance principles in their management of their aid to developing counties (Ceuppens, 2006) . The present study is interested not only in the governance of aid, but all aspects of governance within the context of the ACP-EU 'partnership'.
Partnership and Power
According to Webster's unabridged encyclopaedic dictionary, a 'partnership' is 'the state or condition of being a partner; participation; association; joint interest'. The While access to resources gives the possessor potential power, it can also be argued that aid recipient countries grant the EU this power by allowing the resources that the EU has at its disposal to be used as leverage. If aid recipients were to decline the aid, either categorically or under specific circumstances, these elements of 'power' would dissipate.
In other words, it is the recipients' desire for these resources, and willingness to be manipulated in order to access them, that turns the potential power into real power.
Governance Mechanisms and Governance Assessments
Distinguishing governance as a purposive activity from governance as an explanatory tool (for example to explain development policy failures), Yanakopoulos (2005) investigates the mechanisms through which governance as a purposive activity occurs. Here we will examine governance mechanisms used by the EU in the context of its relationship with the ACP Group. According to the CA and other policy papers, in its relations with ACP States the EU employs, inter alia, the following instruments to promote good governance in development cooperation: conditionalities, 11 'additional support' for results-oriented reforms, incentives, and 'appropriate measures' (sanctions)
as specified in Articles 96 and 97 of the CA. However, it can be argued that EU governance is manifested through additional practices, which include: the determination of priority areas and recipients to benefit from financial assistance; negotiation strategies, In the following section, we will examine a variety of EU instruments and practices that in fact are governance mechanisms. These governance mechanisms will be assessed with regard to: 1) whether the way in which they are wielded exemplifies 'good governance' as a process and 2) whether these processes have or are likely to result in 'good governance' as an outcome, particularly sustainable development and poverty reduction. The examples presented here are chosen for their capacity to illustrate contradictions and undesirable consequences. Thus, we critically highlight examples of bad governance rather than offering a representative sample of governance mechanisms and their use. There are certainly many examples of good governance practices by the EU in its relations with the ACP Group, but our aim is to target the areas that can be improved. Concrete suggestions for improvement are discussed in the final section of the paper.
Wielding the 'Governance' Concept
The first mechanism we will examine is use of the concept of '(good) governance'. Adding adjectives such as 'bad' or 'good' to governance, and specifying a desired outcome of governance processes, such as sustainable development, makes more explicit the normative aspect inherent to the concept's use. However, whether or not certain outcomes of governance processes are included explicitly or only presumed implicitly when the concept is employed, it has been argued that mere use of the concept has been an act of governance. This notion is expressed by Campbell (2006: 4) :
In spite of the use of administrative language formulated in terms of efficiency and good management, put forward as neutral, as if to address essentially technical issues, the notion of governance as proposed by the multilateral financial institutions entails a particular concept of the state, of its role, of its desirable evolution, of state-market relations, of the exercise of power and of a particular political project. In this sense, the notion of governance may be shown to be eminently political.
Campbell accuses such institutions of lacking transparency in their use of the concept of governance because they obscure its 'political' dimension in portraying it as merely technical.
Various authors have argued that the EU has imposed its own models for governing and other priorities under the rubric of promoting 'good governance' (Montagner 2006) . This is evident in the EU's Governance They lack transparency and fail to explicitly acknowledge the value-laden assumptions, and their selective application, regarding models of 'good 13 The tranche is allocated and disbursed as 'additional resources' to the initial country allocation. See EC (2009). See Molenaers and Nijs (2009) and Carbone (this volume) for assessments of the tranche. 14 (1) Political governance: human rights, fundamental freedoms, electoral process, constitutional democracy; (2) The rule of law: judicial and law enforcement system; (3) Control of corruption; (4) Government effectiveness: institutional capacity, public finance management; (5) Economic governance: private-sector/market-friendly policies, management of natural resources; (6) Internal and external security; (7) Social governance: decent work, gender, HIV/AIDS; (8) international and regional context: regional integration, involvement in regional initiatives, migration; (9) Quality of the partnership: political and programming dialogue 15 Euro 2,7 billion allocation under the 10 th EDF (2008 EDF ( -2013 governance'. In this regard, they mark a regressive shift away from the more explicit focus and at least policy level commitment to quality assurance of process and not product. The use of 'governance' assessments, either to justify or hold back development assistance is inherently 'anti-developmental' and undermines good governance.
The EU's use of the concept 'good governance' is exemplified in its failure to distinguish between 'good' and 'democratic' governance and by the elements subsumed under these rubrics. Governance concerns the state's ability to serve the citizens. Such a broad approach allows conceptually to disaggregate governance and other topics such as human rights, democracy or corruption.
By framing a laundry list of its own priorities as aspects of 'good governance', and designing mechanisms purportedly to evaluate countries' achievements at attaining this 'goodness', the EU attempts to establish a particular set of social norms and conventions to guide the decisions and actions of its developing partners. In concurrence, BOND ( In Zambia, the government has chosen to prioritise Health and Education as priority sectors for EC Aid. But the EU has rejected these priorities while imposing unclear and dubious priorities such as governance and competitiveness. By doing so, Brussels clearly disrespects Zambia's sovereignty. It is particularly severe as it concerns a country, like others in the Southern Africa region, which is highly hit by HIV/AIDS, that is destroying its fragile basic social system.
Ironically, CIDSE (Coopération Internationale pour le Développement et la
Solidarité) (2006) has also argued that even the EC's process of defining and setting the criteria for 'governance' failed to adhere to its own criteria for good governance.
Although the Issues Paper released by the EC claims that the EC approach is process oriented, broad, inclusive and in particular facilitates civil society participation, CIDSE sees 'grave contradictions between EC's definition and principles of governance and its own actions in this field' (p. 3).
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Hidden under the guise of the rubrics 'good governance' and 'incentives', the EU continues to coerce development partners to follow EU positions and policies. Contrary to the criteria of good governance as a process, this process lacks transparency and results in a lack of ownership on behalf of the countries targeted by the policies. Furthermore, the outcome of this governance may also be less than 'good', since priorities are set that are not necessarily in the best interest of the developing country, as exemplified in the case of Zambia.
Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs)
The CA stipulates that EPAs 18 would be negotiated in order to better integrate the ACP States into the global economy, promote sustainable development and eradicate poverty in these countries. Both the content of these agreements -which was still being negotiated when this article was penned -as well as the process of negotiations can be seen as mechanisms of governance.
The EPA negotiation process was to a great extent stipulated by the EU, by some accounts, against the will -and interests -of the ACP States. First, the EU stipulated that EPAs were to be concluded not with the ACP Group as a whole, but with six regions within the ACP Group. Furthermore, no country could negotiate within more than one region. Since some countries in Africa are members of more than one regional organisation, they were forced to choose between these groupings. The resulting negotiating groups coincide neither with the six regions of the ACP Group, nor with the membership patterns of the regional organisations. In other words, new regional groupings were formed on the basis of countries' interests for the purpose of negotiating EPAs with the EU. The ACP Group has expressed concern that the pre-existing regional integration processes have been stalled due to the focus placed upon the new alignments press. These authors describe one of the challenges that EPAs pose for African regional integration:
A common perception, expressed by many countries, is that there is little coherence between the EPA agenda and the regional integration processes in Africa. One particular concern has been that countries in the same economic Mandelson's acknowledgement is sustained and elaborated by scholars who argue that market openness can contribute to within country inequality, so 'integration with the global economy is not a substitute for an anti-poverty strategy' (Nissanke and Thorbecke, 2007: 258 ; also see Birdsall, 2007) . Prerequisites for countries to benefit from globalization-induced growth are internal patterns of growth and specialization and forms of integration. Without these factors in place, 'many low-income countries could be locked in an international poverty trap through integration' (UNCTAD, 2002: 265) .
In spite of widespread recognition that developing countries must first make various adjustments before they stand the potential to benefit from opening their markets, proposal that certain concessions on market access on their part be compensated by the EU with additional funding for adjustment costs (Oxfam International, 2006) . In spite of the fact that the EC has repeatedly argued that adjustment funding will be provided through the EDF rather than the EPA, the 10 th EDF allocates no additional funds for EPA-related adjustment costs. Bilal and Stevens (2009: 225) have stated that, 'in terms of predictable levels available for the years to come, one thing is clear: the EDF cannot be the only source of AfT (Aid for Trade)'. Oxfam International (2006: 5) concludes that, 'without funding for adjustment, an EPA cannot hope to provide a developmentally supportive framework in countries with limited capacities and resources'. Thus, as matters currently stand, EPAs are more likely to entrench rather than reduce poverty.
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Partner Preferences
In its dealings with the ACP countries, the EC has in recent years shown various consequent inclusion of the article, ACP countries are now further burdened with bordercontrol responsibilities, in order to prevent weapons trafficking, but they have been allocated no additional resources to cover the high cost of these imposed duties.
Consequently, in order to cover the costs of this EU priority, funds must be diverted from other 'development' priorities. Neither the negotiation process, nor the foreseeable outcomes for sustainable development bear the marks of good governance.
Fisheries Partnership Agreements (FPAs)
The report of a fact finding mission by an ACP-EU JPA delegation to the The EU's pursuit of bilateral fisheries agreements is inconsistent with their
[sic] state aim of promoting regional cooperation in the Pacific and tends to divide the Pacific over the benefits from one of the region's key resources.
The regional contention resulting from the bilateral agreements poses a threat not only to cooperation, integration and political stability in the region but also to long-term, sustainable economic development. Failure to solidify a regional approach to manage such important finite resources could easily lead to every country grabbing -or selling the rights to grab -as much as they can while the supply lasts. This would quickly result in a complete depletion of the fish population, which would have a devastating effect on the Pacific economy, way of life, and the health of its people.
Discussion and Recommendations
The EU has considerable resources at its disposal that contribute to a significant power differential between it and the ACP Group. It wields a variety of mechanisms to govern these resources in its relationship with ACP States. By illuminating a few of these mechanisms, this paper has endeavoured to shed some light on these governance processes and their outcomes. There is considerable evidence that some policies pursued by the EU are not conducive to the promotion of sustainable development, the alleviation of poverty, and the gradual integration of ACP States into the world economy. The EU has abused its power advantage to impose its political will and economic agenda. The processes by which the EU, and especially the EC, has used to steer the members of the ACP Group toward compliance with its own interests and agendas are far from transparent. The opaque nature of these processes, and the fact that they leave the EU entirely unaccountable for their consequences, are trademarks of processes of bad governance.
The EU is not managing its relations with the ACP Group in accordance with its vows to respect ACP sovereignty and promote ownership of adopted policies and practices. A genuine partnership between the EU and the ACP Group must be based on a jointly developed structured cooperation framework that sets out the responsibilities of both sides, includes regular and transparent dialogue, and allows the developing countries to take the lead in the formulation of their own development strategies. All provisions of the CA should be regarded as subordinate to the key objectives of the Agreement, including 'appropriate measures', conditionalities, and -perhaps more importantly --how these are determined. Rather than imposing duties upon the ACP Group that it is illsuited to fulfil, the EU should first provide the Group with means for capacity building and institutional support that will allow for the development of a capable, credible, and respected partner.
Appropriate capacity-building and institutional support includes paying fair wages and fees for services rendered. It entails applying standards fairly and enforcing policies that protect the long-term interests of developing populations. Contrarily, on various accounts the EU has promoted policies and engaged in practices that have contributed to further deprivation in ACP States and regions.
What can the EU do to promote the gradual integration of ACP States into the global economy? According to Nissanke and Thorbecke (2007: 265) ,
Whether global market forces establish a virtuous circle or a vicious circle depends on the initial conditions at the time of exposure and the effective design and implementation of policies to manage the integration process.
Consequently, these authors advocate the constitution of global governance structures that promote development. Birdsall (2007: 243) also claims that 'the global economy needs the civilizing hand of appropriate intervention', which she argues must include more transfers from rich to poor countries, more active management of global problems such as money laundering, tax evasion, sovereign bankruptcy, capital flight, global health and environmental issues, and a 'global social contract'. In order to support the integration of ACP countries into the global economy in a way that promotes sustainable development and poverty reduction, the EU should first ensure that global governance structures are in place that can competently manage the integration process. To support the creation of, and provide resources for, competent, transparent and accountable global structures would be acts of good governance.
To a certain extent, the ACP Group elevates the EC to its relatively powerful position by failing to act in a collective fashion in order to condense and wield potential power of its own. The ACP Group does have potential carrots and sticks at its disposal.
For example, collectively ACP States have attractive natural resources and vast markets, access to which is desired not only by the EU but also others (such as China and the USA). Furthermore, the collective voice of 79 developing countries, plus the support of development-friendly NGOs and other benefactors, could exert a considerable amount of normative pressure. They might begin with a critique of the EC's wielding of governance mechanisms.
Since the EC's power leverage largely derives from its command of the EDF, changes in how this fund is governed could make the system less prone to the abuse of power. While the EDF is funded by voluntary contributions from EU Member States, it is managed by the EC. Notwithstanding the at least rhetorical stipulation that funding decisions be made in consultation with the ACP Group, the EC currently has sole decision-making powers over the disbursement of the EDF. As it is a separate instrument from the EU general budget, the European Parliament (EP) has no oversight over the EC's management of the EDF. EU Member States and the EP generally act as checks and balances to the EC, and they have frequently critiqued the ECs actions in relations with developing countries. Thus, a system of development aid and cooperation that has these checks and balances in place might prove more apt at engaging in well-governed and development-conducive partnerships. A partner that manifests the criteria of good governance in its relationships, especially in those with weaker counterparts, will also be better positioned to advocate good governance.
